WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. v. BOBBY SINGLETON, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
No. 25A1316
WES ALLEN, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL.
v.
MARCUS CASTER, ET AL.
ON APPLICATION FOR STAY
[June 2, 2026]
PER CURIAM.
In Louisiana v. Callais, 608 U. S. ___ (2026), to resolve the tension between vote-dilution claims under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and our colorblind Constitution, we updated the standards for §2 liability established by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30 (1986). Under Gingles, to prove a §2 violation, a plaintiff must first establish three preconditions. First, the minority group must be large and geographically compact enough to be a majority in a reasonably configured congressional district, meaning that the district “comports with traditional districting criteria.” Callais, 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, the minority group must be politically cohesive. Third, the majority group must vote enough as a bloc to defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate. Ibid. After establishing those three preconditions, the plaintiff must prove that the political process was not equally open to minority voters based on the totality of the circumstances. Ibid.
This first paragraph sets up tensions that need court resolution, the tension between vote-dilution claims under §2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and our colorblind Constitution, that resulted in the court's updated standards for §2 liability established by Thronburg v Gingles to prove a §2 violation:
First, the minority group must be large and geographically compact enough to be a majority in a reasonably configured congressional district, meaning that the district “comports with traditional districting criteria.” Callais, 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Second, the minority group must be politically cohesive.
Third, the majority group must vote enough as a bloc to defeat the minority group’s preferred candidate. Ibid. After establishing those three preconditions, the plaintiff must prove that the political process was not equally open to minority voters based on the totality of the circumstances. Ibid.
The sad part of this SCOTUS logic is that it is as racist as it can get. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed as a legislative means to put street words to the 15th and 14th Amendments, amendments that were made a part of the orginal Constitution which was lacking in these new protections. The orginal Constitution failed to address these shortcomings and it took a Civil War and the death of of over one million Americans to create the language embedded in these amendments.
What SCOTUS is saying here is that the 14th and 15th Amendments disturb the essence of our "colorbling Constitution." They are saying that sans these amendments, the original Constitution was colorblind, a view stated in Plessy v Ferguson (1896), a view that spun off Jim Crow through the early '60's, which the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Acts were trying to prevent by putting into legislative practice the protections afforded by these amendments.
Callais updated these standards. As relevant here, we held that for plaintiffs to satisfy the first Gingles precondition, a plaintiff ’s alternative map “must meet all the State’s legitimate districting objectives” “just as well” as the State’s own map. 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 29) (emphasis added). Those legitimate districting objectives, we held, include “the State’s specified political goals” and “any other goal not prohibited by the Constitution.” Ibid. A plaintiff also “cannot use race as a districting criterion” in preparing the alternative map. Ibid. To prove the second and third preconditions, a plaintiff “must provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation” and “show that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 30). These updates, we held, were necessary to avoid requiring congressional maps under §2 that would be unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.
In Callais, the court updated these standards: First, the challenging party, i.e., the plaintiff, atlernative map must meet all of the State's legitimate districting objectives just as well as the State's own map. Those legitimate districting objectives, we held, include “the State’s specified political goals” and “any other goal not prohibited by the Constitution. A plaintiff also “cannot use race as a districting criterion” in preparing the alternative map. To prove the second and third preconditions, a plaintiff “must provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation” and “show that voters engage in racial bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation.” These updates, we held, were necessary to avoid requiring congressional maps under §2 that would be unconstitutional racial gerrymanders.
After Callais, we vacated District Court injunctions that prevented the State of Alabama from using a congressional map that it enacted in 2023. See Allen v. Caster, 608 U. S. ___ (2026). The District Court had held that the State’s map violated §2 because it had only one district in which black voters were a majority and did not include an additional “[b]lack-opportunity” district. Singleton v. Allen, 782 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1114, 1309 (ND Ala. 2025). The District Court also concluded that the 2023 map violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it constituted a deliberate “refus[al] to satisfy the remedial requirements” it previously imposed and an attempt to avoid a future judgment requiring the same remedy. Id., at 1355.
The court here is laying out the court's acts of vacating District court injunctions denying State acts which violated §2 of the VRA and provisions of the 14th Amendment.
Two weeks after we vacated its injunction, the District Court entered another injunction on largely the same grounds. State officials immediately applied to this Court for a stay of this injunction.
The Distric Court entered another injunction and the State is asking for a stay.
At this preliminary stage, the State has shown that it is entitled to interim relief from the District Court’s injunction. See Abbott v. League of United Latin American Citizens, 607 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2025) (slip op., at 1–2). The State is likely to succeed on the merits as to both claims. As to intentional vote dilution, the District Court did not heed the presumption of legislative good faith, see Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1, 10 (2024), because it interpreted the State’s legal disagreement with the court’s earlier remedial order as proof of discriminatory animus. Cf. Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 608–609 (2018). And, as to both claims, the District Court’s analysis departed from Callais. Under Callais, the District Court was required to deny relief unless the plaintiffs’ alternative map performed “just as well” with respect to all of the State’s constitutionally permissible districting criteria. 608 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 29). Yet, the District Court found a violation even though the plaintiffs’ alternative map would not perform just as well as to the State’s constitutionally permissible criteria of keeping together the Gulf Coast community of interest and avoiding the pairing of incumbents. The District Court also failed to follow our instruction in Callais that the mere fact that voters of different races vote for different parties is not relevant to proving racially polarized voting patterns. See id., at ___ (slip op., at 30).
The court notes that Alabama is before the court seeking immediate relief, a stay of the Dristrict Court's injunction. The court notes that Alabama is likely to succeed. As to intentional voting dilution, the District Court did not heed the presumption of legislative good faith. Additionally, the court argued that the District Court had failed to follow Callais that voters of different races vote for different parties is not relevant to prove racially polarized voting patterns.
The State has also made a strong showing of irreparable harm and that the equities and public interest favor it. We have repeatedly cautioned that lower federal courts should not “alter the election rules on the eve of an election.”
Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee, 589 U. S. 423, 424 (2020) (per curiam). Here, the District Court interposed itself into Alabama’s ongoing efforts to conduct its imminent 2026 congressional elections under maps that its elected representatives selected. Its view that conducting the elections under court-imposed maps would be more convenient for the State was not a valid justification for that intervention. While federal courts should not impose changes close to an election, ibid., States are free to decide for themselves whether last-minute changes to an election are in their best interests.
These two paragraphs above involve the Purcell (2002) standard, that courts should not intervene in election matters that are too close to an election event. What the court is saying here is that too close to an election, the state can do whatever with elections, because the state knows best. So the state can discriminate in voting changes too close to an election event, but the courts cannot intervene.
Purcell needs to be revisited by Congress.
The applications for stay presented to JUSTICE THOMAS and by him referred to the Court are granted. The May 26, 2026, order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, case Nos. 2:21–cv–1530 and 2:21–cv–1291 is stayed pending the timely docketing of the appeal in this Court. Should the jurisdictional statement be timely filed, this order shall remain in effect pending this Court’s action on the appeal. If the appeal is dismissed, or the judgment affirmed, this order shall terminate automatically. In the event jurisdiction is noted or postponed, this order will remain in effect pending the sending down of the judgment of this Court. The May 26, 2026, order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, case No. 2:21–cv–1536, is stayed pending the timely filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari. Should the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.
The injunction of halting the lower court order is stayed, halted, and Alabama may proceed with it's newly altered maps.
It is so ordered
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