Saturday, May 23, 2026

Institute for the Study of War - How Iran Hopes to Control the Strait of Hormuz: It’s Not Just About Fees

 

How Iran Hopes to Control the Strait of Hormuz: It’s Not Just About Fees

May 23, 2026

Brian Carter

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One of Iran’s primary objectives in the current negotiations is to secure its sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. This objective is more important for Tehran than securing fees from merchant vessels as they transit the Strait. Many Iranian officials have said that their goal is to ensure Iranian sovereignty over the strait, and this demand has featured prominently in negotiations to end the Iran War. Tehran may be willing to “trade” this objective for major gains on the nuclear program, sanctions relief, the release of frozen funds, or a large-scale US withdrawal from the region. But all of these “trades” are still bad from a US perspective and accomplish other key Iranian strategic objectives. US and world vital interests require denying Iran control of the strait by negotiations or by force.


Iran likely sees two paths to controlling the strait. First, Iranian control could be officially recognized by the United States through an agreement. Other countries would probably oppose such recognition, but changing the new status quo would be extremely challenging. Second, Iran could maintain the current situation by firing missiles or drones (or credibly threatening to do so) at ships that fail to heed Iranian demands related to transiting the strait. Very few countries—and perhaps none—will approve of Iranian threats, but stopping Iranian coercion will require the use of force or an agreement that formally ends Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz.


Iran’s scheme to extract large fees for safe transit through the strait will likely fail, absent a major change in the appetite among shipping companies for risking sanctions. But the failure of the fee scheme does not ipso facto result in a failure of Iran’s scheme to control the strait. Many shipping companies are extremely hesitant to pay Iran for transit due to sanctions compliance issues, but even if these ships do not pay Iran, they still cannot pass the strait without serious risk-taking.

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