Wednesday, June 10, 2026

Institute for the Study of War - Iran Update Special Report, June 9, 2026

 

June 9, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Adham Fattah, Ben Schmida, Parker Hempel, Will Doran, Nidal Morrison, Katherine Wells, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

TOPLINES

The Iranian regime is attempting to use calibrated force in an attempt to extract concessions from the United States without triggering a full-scale US response. Recent statements from senior Iranian officials and regime-affiliated media suggest that Iran believes that it is at war—not in a ceasefire—and views military action as a tactic to improve its negotiating position to serve the regime’s strategic objectives. Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf stated on June 8 that Iran must use military action and diplomacy in a complementary way, in which Iranian military action creates favorable conditions for the regime so that diplomacy can turn these conditions into ”legal, political, and economic achievements.“ Regime-affiliated outlet Nour News argued on June 9 that the recent round of strikes between Iran and Israel occurred because each side is attempting to use limited military action in order to strengthen its position in negotiations without triggering a full-scale war. These statements and regime media opinions suggest that the regime views negotiations as a continuation of the war with the United States and perceives military action as a tool to secure the regime’s objectives in negotiations.


Iranian officials appear to be calibrating their response to avoid triggering a major US response. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi stated on June 9 that "foreign forces” are at constant risk due to their own errors and should leave the region because Iran will never be "hospitable” to their presence. Araghchi‘s statement is likely a reference to the Iranian attack on the US Apache helicopter (see below) and notably stops short of explicitly naming or threatening US forces. The attack is consistent with Iran’s broader effort to secure recognition of its control over the strait by deterring US intervention to protect maritime traffic, but the operation’s limited scope suggests that Iran seeks to increase pressure on the United States through limited military action to secure greater concessions in negotiations while avoiding a return to full-blown war.


Iran has likely designed this new approach based on an assessment that the United States does not want to return to war. Nour News, for example, highlighted that neither side wants to trigger a full-scale conflict, which implies that Nour News—a regime-affiliated outlet—believes that the United States does not want to return to war. US President Donald Trump has attempted to avoid a return to war. He has also said explicitly that he seeks to avoid war, which would increase Iran’s confidence in its assessment. Avoiding a return to large-scale operations is beneficial for Iran because it allows Iran to drag out the economic and political pressure on the United States and Israel. Iran faces its own economic pressure due to war damages and the US Navy blockade, but the Iranian regime only cares about economic damage insofar as it damages the regime’s parochial interests and threatens regime security.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Iranian regime is attempting to use calibrated force in an attempt to extract concessions from the United States without triggering a full-scale US response. Iran has likely designed this new approach based on an assessment that the United States does not want to return to war.


  • Iran is using force against US forces near the Strait of Hormuz, likely in an effort to deter US forces from operating in the Strait of Hormuz for any reason. An Iranian drone downed a US Army AH-64 Apache gunship near the coast of Oman on June 8. This use of force is designed to achieve the Iranian war aim of asserting its control over the strait.


  • US President Donald Trump emphasized that the United States must respond to the Iranian attack. ISW-CTP is monitoring reports of a “proportional” US response as of 5:50 PM ET on June 9. ISW-CTP will provide more details on the US response in its June 10 morning thread and evening update.


  • The Houthis continue to threaten to restrict commercial shipping in the Bab el Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea, but they have not yet conducted attacks to realize these threats.


  • Hezbollah and Iran appear not to have effectively deterred Israel from striking Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon.

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