Thursday, June 4, 2026

Institute for the Study of War - Iran Update Special Report, June 4, 2026

 

June 4, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Carolyn Moorman, Will Doran, Katherine Wells, Ben Schmida, Avery Borens, and Annika Ganzeveld

TOPLINES

Hezbollah and Iranian leaders continue to reject any ceasefire framework in Lebanon that does not meet their maximalist demand for total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon. Hezbollah and Iran’s insistence on this demand is part of an effort to defer negotiations about key points of disagreement between Iran and the United States, particularly Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz, and strengthen Iran’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the United States. The United States, Israel, and Lebanon issued a joint statement on June 3 agreeing to implement a ceasefire contingent upon Hezbollah’s agreement to halt all attacks and evacuate its fighters south of the Litani River. The joint statement indicates that Israel, Lebanon, and the United States seek to develop a framework to achieve their respective long-term objectives in Lebanon. The statement announced that Israel and Lebanon would coordinate to establish “pilot zones” in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) would deploy to these zones “to the exclusion of all non-state actors.” The Lebanese government confirmed that the LAF has begun deploying to southern Lebanese territory that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) seized during ground operations against Hezbollah. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun called the joint statement the “last opportunity” to obtain “a final and comprehensive ceasefire” in Lebanon on June 4. Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter separately said on June 4 that a ceasefire in Lebanon would be contingent upon Hezbollah’s “complete dismantling.” Hezbollah rejected the joint statement’s condition that the group cease attacks and withdraw to north of the Litani River. 


Hezbollah and Iranian leaders are unified in viewing Israeli capitulation in Lebanon as inextricable from Iranian negotiations with the United States. Qassem acknowledged Iran’s role in pushing for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and noted that Iran’s push for a complete ceasefire is an “integral part” of Iran’s own efforts against the United States. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani also called for a full ceasefire in Lebanon and complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon on June 4. The IRGC similarly stated on June 4 that a ceasefire on “all fronts” was Iran’s “initial condition” for the US-Iran ceasefire, which went into effect in early April. Senior Iranian officials, including former IRGC Commander and current IRGC Baghiyatollah Sociocultural Headquarters Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, previously described a ceasefire in Lebanon as a precondition for negotiations with the United States. Iranian officials have re-emphasized this issue in recent days amid the deadlock in US-Iran negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz, however.


Iranian officials have continued to emphasize the Lebanon issue in order to try to deflect focus away from key points of disagreement in the US-Iran negotiations, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program, which the regime seeks to avoid making concessions on. The United States and Iran do not currently appear to be discussing Iran’s nuclear program, given that Iran suspended negotiations until a complete ceasefire in Lebanon is reached. ISW-CTP previously noted that a protracted discussion about Lebanon deflects from negotiations over Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile and ability to enrich uranium. Iranian officials and media have also not commented on US demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program in recent days. Iranian officials and media continue to insist that Iran will not cede control of the Strait of Hormuz, however. A newspaper published on the Supreme Leader’s website, Voice of Iran, published an op-ed on June 2 claiming that Iran has the “winning cards” in negotiations over the strait and that the status of the strait will not return to pre-war conditions. This comment reflects how the Iranian regime does not solely seek to survive this war and return to the pre-war status quo; the regime has positive objectives that it seeks to achieve, including securing Iranian sovereignty over the strait.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Hezbollah and Iranian leaders continue to reject any ceasefire framework in Lebanon that does not meet their maximalist demand for total Israeli capitulation in Lebanon. Hezbollah and Iran’s insistence on this demand is part of an effort to defer negotiations about key points of disagreement between Iran and the United States, particularly Iranian efforts to control the Strait of Hormuz, and strengthen Iran’s negotiating position vis-à-vis the United States.


  • Hezbollah and Iranian leaders are unified in viewing Israeli capitulation in Lebanon as inextricable from Iranian negotiations with the United States. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem acknowledged Iran’s role in pushing for a complete ceasefire in Lebanon and noted that Iran’s push for a complete ceasefire is an “integral part” of Iran’s own efforts against the United States.


  • Iranian officials have continued to emphasize the Lebanon issue in order to try to deflect focus away from key points of disagreement in the US-Iran negotiations, particularly the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program, which the regime seeks to avoid making concessions on. A newspaper linked to the Supreme Leader’s office argued on June 2 that the status of the Strait of Hormuz will not return to its pre-war status. This comment reflects how the Iranian regime does not solely seek to survive this war and return to the pre-war status quo; the regime has positive objectives that it seeks to achieve, including securing Iranian sovereignty over the strait.


  • The Iraqi federal government has begun to try to restrict arms to the state through the disarmament and integration of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment, including the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).


  • Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is also reportedly pursuing a plan, approved by unidentified framework leaders, in which disarmed militia members would integrate into other Iraqi security institutions, such as the Counter Terrorism Service (CTS). Any Iraqi federal government attempt to disarm the militias and integrate them into the Iraqi security establishment that does not address the militias’ networks and allegiance to Iran will likely further embed Iranian influence within the Iraqi state.

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