Institute for the Study of War - Iran Update Special Report, May 25, 2026

 

May 25, 2026 Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET Katherine Wells, Carolyn Moorman, Will Doran, Nidal Morrison, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter DONATE As the Middle East crisis evolves, ISW urgently needs your support. Help us stay independent and impactful. TOPLINES The United States and Iran continue to hold fundamentally different positions on most major issues within the US-Iran “agreement.” Iran has not publicly committed to removing its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles or to halting uranium enrichment in Iran, reinforcing broader uncertainty around the negotiations. Iran has so far been unwilling to transfer its HEU stockpile outside Iran, and officials and media consistently assert that any US demand for zero enrichment—or even a return to Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — level enrichment at 3.6% — is a red line for Iran. US President Donald Trump said on May 25 that any deal with Iran must be “great and meaningful,“ and explicitly rejected “anything like the JCPOA.” Iran has continued to claim that it and Oman control the Strait of Hormuz as territorial waters. Iranian officials are attempting to reframe transit tolls as “protection fees” to give Iran’s protection racket the veneer of legality. The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway under international law. Iran is claiming that the strait is territorial waters and under the administration of “coastal” states. It is notable in this context that Iran does not define the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a coastal state, even though the UAE borders the strait. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson has attempted to reframe transit tolls as ”protection fees” and “environmental fees,” but both of these are tolls, and neither is legal in an international waterway. Iran remains the only power that has threatened civilian shipping in the Strait of Hormuz during this war, meaning that its “protection fee” is a protection racket that ships must pay to avoid Iranian attack. US officials are explicitly against any fee system in the Strait of Hormuz, and this issue remains a core disagreement in ongoing talks. US President Donald Trump urged on May 25 the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan to join the Abraham Accords. Trump said that Saudi Arabia and Qatar should be the first countries to do so and added that a failure to join the Abraham Accords “shows bad intention.” Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan currently recognize Israel but are not members of the Accords. READ THE FULL UPDATE KEY TAKEAWAYS The United States and Iran continue to hold fundamentally different positions on most major issues within the US-Iran “agreement.” Iran has not publicly committed to removing its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpiles or to halting uranium enrichment in Iran, reinforcing broader uncertainty around the negotiations. US President Donald Trump said on May 25 that any deal with Iran must be “great and meaningful,” and explicitly rejected “anything like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).” Iran has continued to claim that it and Oman control the Strait of Hormuz as territorial waters. Iranian officials are attempting to reframe transit tolls as “protection fees” to give Iran’s protection racket the veneer of legality. The Strait of Hormuz is an international waterway under international law. Iran is claiming that the strait is territorial waters and under the administration of “coastal” states. It is notable in this context that Iran does not define the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a coastal state, even though the UAE borders the strait. US President Donald Trump urged on May 25 the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan to join the Abraham Accords.  Hezbollah drone operators have likely developed a rudimentary tactical approach to coordinate multiple small first-person view (FPV) drone strikes in a short period of time. The “swarm” attacks appear to employ three or more drones operating in a staggered but near-simultaneous manner. This system is extremely rudimentary and would either require a single commander to coordinate the attack or a preset, prioritized list of strikes that cannot be dynamically changed. Hezbollah will likely attempt to overcome the shortcomings of this tactical approach. 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