Sunday, May 24, 2026

Institute for the Study of War - Iran Update Special Report, May 24, 2026

 

May 24, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Ben Rezaei, Parker Hempel, William Doran, Nidal Morrison, Katherine Wells, Brian Carter, and Nicholas Carl

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TOPLINES

Conflicting US, Iranian, and regional reporting indicates that the contours of a possible US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) remain unresolved and may not yet represent a final agreement. US President Donald Trump stated on May 23 that a deal to end the war had been “largely negotiated” and awaited finalization. A senior US official stated in a briefing with reporters on May 24 that the White House does not expect an agreement on May 24 and believes Iranian leadership, including Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, may need several days to approve the deal. An unspecified senior US official told Axios that the United States is in a “very good place” but that the parties are still negotiating specific language and that “whether this becomes an agreement is still an open question.” Trump separately stated on May 24 that a possible Iran deal “isn’t even fully negotiated yet,” while stating that any agreement would not give Iran “a clear and open path to a Nuclear Weapon.” Trump later stated that negotiations are proceeding in an “orderly and constructive manner,” but added that he had instructed his representatives ”not to rush into a deal” because time is on the US side. Trump also stated that the US naval blockade ”will remain in full force and effect” until an agreement is “reached, certified, and signed.”


Iranian officials, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlets, and Iranian sources speaking to Western and regional media are presenting the possible MOU as conditional on US concessions and continued Iranian leverage. An unspecified senior Iranian official told Reuters on May 24 that the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) will convene to approve or reject the current draft and will send it to Mojtaba for final approval if the SNSC approves it. An unspecified senior Iranian source separately told CNN that recent mediated talks have made “a lot of progress” and could mark a “turning point” toward ending the war and creating a “new era of stability and prosperity” in the region. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency reported on May 24 that disputes over one or two provisions remain unresolved due to US “obstruction” and that the MOU could still fall through if the United States does not meet Iranian demands. US “obstruction” in this context probably refers to US insistence on legitimate demands that the Iranians oppose. IRGC-affiliated reporting has identified frozen assets, sanctions relief, the naval blockade, Lebanon, and the Strait of Hormuz as the main unresolved issues. This is every issue in the first stage of the agreement, before talks on the nuclear program. Tasnim reported that an informed source said Iran will not accept any understanding without the release of a “specified portion” of Iran’s blocked assets in the first step and a clear mechanism to guarantee continued access to all blocked assets. A well-informed Iranian source told an Al Jazeera journalist on May 24 that the two central issues involve the mechanism for unfreezing Iranian assets and the scope of a Lebanon ceasefire. The source added that Iran rejected a Pakistani proposal to move ahead with agreed provisions while postponing unresolved ones.


IRGC-affiliated messaging in domestic Iranian media has said that Iran will stick to its redlines, while quotes from unspecified Iranian officials in Western media have sought to portray the talks in a positive light by describing “progress.” Unspecified Iranian officials speaking to Western outlets have described progress and an internal approval process through the SNSC and Mojtaba, which suggests that some Iranian officials want to present the draft as a viable diplomatic path. IRGC-affiliated outlets, however, have emphasized red lines, US “obstruction,” blocked assets, sanctions relief, and continued Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Conflicting US, Iranian, and regional reporting indicates that the contours of a possible US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) remain unresolved and may not yet represent a final agreement.


  • Iranian officials, Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated outlets, and Iranian sources speaking to Western and regional media are presenting the possible MOU as conditional on US concessions and continued Iranian leverage.


  • IRGC-affiliated reporting has identified frozen assets, sanctions relief, the naval blockade, Lebanon, and the Strait of Hormuz as the main unresolved issues. This is every issue in the first stage of the agreement, before talks on the nuclear program. 


  • Mediators appear to be trying to preserve momentum toward a US-Iran MOU by sequencing unresolved issues and developing technical arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz, but Iranian reporting suggests that Iran has rejected efforts to defer its core demands.


  • Iran appears to believe that it is negotiating from a stronger position than the United States and is accordingly attempting to remake the regional order in a way that benefits Iran.


  • Iran has not publicly accepted meaningful nuclear concessions in the possible MOU, and Iran believes that the draft defers nuclear talks until after Iran secures relief from military and economic pressure.


  • Iranian officials have stated that the US-Iran MOU must end the war “on all fronts,” including in Lebanon. The United States supports continued Israeli operations against Hezbollah, however, to prevent threats to Israel.


  • Israeli officials have reportedly called on the United States to allow the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to continue its operations in Lebanon, in accordance with the current temporary ceasefire in Lebanon, and President Trump agreed with this position.


  • Hezbollah officials have continuously reiterated that the group will continue to engage the IDF in southern Lebanon and launch attacks against northern Israel until the IDF completely halts its activity in Lebanon and withdraws from southern Lebanese territory.

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